RETURN TO ALEXTHORN.COM WRITINGS SECTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
and Secondary Liability
 

 

 

 

Alex Thorn

The Judicial Process / PSCI 262


TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)

AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir.1990)

Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. 76 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 1996)

In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation No 02-4125 (7th Cir. 2003)

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.Supp. 2d 1029 (2001)

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. et. al. v. Grokster, Ltd. et. al. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. et. al. v. Grokster, Ltd. et. al. No. 03-56236 (9th Cir. 2004).

Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417 (1984)

Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)

So. Mississippi Planning & Development District, Inc. v. Robertson, 660 F.Supp. 1057 (S.D.Miss. 1986)

United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir.1990)

United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir.1985)

United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 550 (7th Cir.1988).

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(books, articles, non-opinion court documents)

 

Brief Amici Curiae of the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Directors Guild of America, Screen Actors Guild and Writers Guild of America on behalf of the petitioners, MGM et. al., in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., et. al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et. al. No. 03-56236 (9th Cir., filed August 19, 2004)

 

MGM initial brief for the Federal District Court for the Central District of California demanding Summary Judgment against Grokster, Inc. and StreamCast, Inc. in MGM v. Grokster, Dec. 2, 2002. <http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/20020913_mgm_summary_judgement.pdf> Accessed on April 1, 2004.

 

Peters, Marybeth. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on S. 2560, the Intentional Inducement of Copyright Infringements Act of 2004: Statement of the Honorable Marybeth Peters. July 22, 2004. Accessed 2 April 2005. <http://www.corante.com/importance/archives/Statement_of_Marybeth_Peters_on_S_2560-1.pdf>.

 

Petitioner’s Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company Petitioners in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., et. al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et. al. No. 03-56236 (9th Cir., filed August 19, 2004)


McGuire, David. “Lawmakers Push Prison For Online Pirates.” Washington Post 31 Mar. 2004. Washington Post Online. Accessed 31 Mar. 2005 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A40145-2004Mar31?language=printer>.

 

Oberholzer, Felix & Strumpf, Koleman. The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis. March, 2004. Accessed 31 Mar. 2004 <http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf>.

 

 


            On March 29, the Supreme Court of the United States heard oral arguments in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. et.al.  v. Grokster, Ltd. Et. Al. No. 04-480 (hereinafter referred to as “the Grokster case” or “MGM v. Grokster”), accepted on Oct. 10, 2004 after Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios (hereinafter referred to as “the petitioners”) lost its case against Grokster, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Grokster”) in the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.[1] The decision in this case comes after years of litigation that began with the 2nd Circuits 2001 ruling against Napster, Inc.[2] (hereinafter referred to as “Napster”) and issuance of a preliminary injunction demanding the immediate termination of the service. Although the district and circuit courts have thus far ruled in favor of Grokster, Inc. and StreamCast Networks, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “the respondents”), there is compelling evidence in favor of the petitioners as well as a divided circuit court system to influence the High Court.  

            The decision in the Grokster case will set legal precedent and end file-sharing legal battles that have been raging for the last five years. On Oct. 2, 2001 as millions of people logged on to the peer-to-peer networks Kazaa and Grokster, 28 of the entertainment industry’s elite[3] sued the programs’ operators for allowing their users to illegally download copyrighted material. While this may have been the official start of the case, the stage for the legal battle over file-sharing started year’s earlier when file-sharing giant and innovator Napster lost its case in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in early 2001 and was dismantled. It was only a matter of time before the music and movie companies came knocking on the doors of other makers of file-sharing software. These newer peer-to-peer programs, such as Grokster, allow user computers to connect with other computers to share and copy each other’s files. The reason this new generation of software is different from Napster lies in the technology.[4]

            The question before the Supreme Court is whether the 9th Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to long-established principles of secondary liability[5] (and in acknowledged conflict with the 7th and 9th Circuits)[6] that internet-based file-sharing services Grokster and StreamCast, Inc. (whose Kazaa program uses the same technology as Grokster) should be immunized from copyright liability for the millions of daily acts of copyright infringement that occur on through their services and that constitute of at least 88% of the total use of the services.[7] The petitioners have alleged that the respondents should be held liable for contributory and vicarious liability.[8]  

            Perhaps the most significant development in secondary liability was the Supreme Court's first attempt to interpret the 1976 Copyright Act, Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417 (1984) (hereinafter referred to as “Sony”) Often referred to as the “Betamax” case, Sony involved the question of whether a manufacturer of a VCR (such as the Sony Betamax) could be held liable under the doctrines of secondary liability for the infringing actions of the customers who buy the VCR. The Court recognized that secondary liability was established in copyright law: [V]icarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another.[9] But, the Court concluded that these doctrines had not been applied to a situation presented by the VCR, where the manufacturer did not have actual knowledge of the infringing activity for which customers used the device, only “constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.”[10]

            The evolution and use of this cases precedent has varied. The 9th and 7th In Napster, the 9th Circuit found that Napster had “both actual and constructive knowledge that its users exchanged copyrighted music…”[11] and therefore was liable for contributory infringement. The court argued that in Sony, the Sony Corporation merely knew that its product was being used to illegally duplicate copyrighted materials, whereas Napster possessed evidence, data, and the “right and ability to supervise its users’ conduct.”[12] The ability to supervise, the Circuit Court ruled, makes Napster vicariously liable because it fails to “use its ability to patrol its system and preclude access to potentially infringing files listed in its search index.”[13] In In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation No 02-4125 (7th Cir. 2003) (hereinafter referred to as “Aimster”), Circuit Judge Posner wrote on behalf of the Court that “actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer.”[14] The court rejected Aimster’s argument “that to prevail, the recording industry must prove it has actually lost money as a result of the copying [Aimster’s] service facilitates.”[15] The court also rejected Aimster’s argument that because of its encrypted search functions[16] it had successfully removed itself from the transaction, stating that “one who, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is involved in shady dealings and takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings is held to have criminal intent.”[17]

            The precedential value of Sony has also been upheld. The 9th Circuit held in the Grokster case the exact opposite, ruling that the file-sharing companies’ knowledge of the infringements doesn’t make them liable, there is no “issue of material fact as to whether defendants have the right and ability to supervise direct infringers”[18] or block individual users, and that the copyright owners’ claim that Grokster “[turns] a ‘blind eye’ to the infringement of their users”[19] lacked validity because “there is no separate ‘blind eye’ theory or element of vicarious liability that exists independently of the traditional elements of liability.”[20] However, the court’s response to the “blind eye” argument is nearly as unfounded as the argument itself, as is the court’s dismissal of the question over Grokster’s “right and ability to supervise direct infringers.”

            In ruling on the appeal from petitioners MGM et. al., one of the most important and distinguishing issues in Sony is the notion that many users of the Betamax VCR used the device for “time-shifting.” Justice Stevens describes time-shifting in Sony’s majority opinion:

The respondents and Sony both conducted surveys of the way the Betamax machine was used by several hundred owners during a sample period in 1978. Although there were some differences in the surveys, they both showed that the primary use of the machine for most owners was "time-shifting" -- the practice of recording a program to view it once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Time-shifting enables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss because they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or are viewing a program on another station at the time of a broadcast that they desire to watch. Both surveys also showed, however, that a substantial number of interviewees had accumulated libraries of tapes. Sony's survey indicated that over 80% of the interviewees watched at least as much regular television as they had before owning a Betamax. Respondents offered no evidence of decreased television viewing by Betamax owners.[21]

 

A major justification for the court’s ruling in Sony was the fact that most, four out of five users of the Betamax VCR, only used the device to tape shows for a later viewing, at which time they would be replaced. Justice Stevens found weight in this argument because, in fact, of the total programs viewed by Betamax users in the month before trial 70.4% had been viewed only that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further viewing.[22] Not only were non-infringing uses possible, but according to the relevant data, most users of the Betamax VCR had not engaged in the illegal, “library building” style of television duplication.

            This type of “time shifting” has been discussed but has proved largely inapplicable in file-sharing history. It has been accepted that the downloading of songs to which the user already has paid for is not illegal, just as the making of copies for personal use is not a copyright infringement. This type of downloading or duplicating is the closest equivalent to the time-shifting discussed in Sony. The petitioners in the Grokster case argue that 88% of the material transferred through the respondents’ networks is done illegally with no intent to “time-shift” or back up/duplicate previously purchased copies.[23] Even if the actual percentage of illegally transferred materials is not exactly 88%, it is at least telling of the shear magnitude of illegal duplication and sharing that exists via the internet. This key difference between Sony’s Betamax VCR and the services provided by Grokster and StreamCast illustrates the major disparity between the two cases and why the precedential impact of Sony will be limited.

            It is important to note, also, that Grokster consciously chose not to use filters to terminate illegal downloading of copyrighted materials. Rather than actually filter the content and stop all illegal activity, Grokster instead took steps to remove itself from the search process and, subsequently, from liability. In Aimster, the 7th Circuit has found that, “one who, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is involved in shady dealings and takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings is held to have criminal intent.”[24] By consciously not filtering the content out of its system, Grokster became liable for secondary infringement.

            The technical questions regarding liability is compounded by a moral sense that Grokster tried to find a legal loophole in order to escape the same fate as its predecessor, Napster, and thus it clearly operated with both the intent and knowledge that it was facilitating illegal activity. It has been clearly established by the 7th Circuit that “one who, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is involved in shady dealings and takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings is held to have criminal intent, because a deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge is all that the law requires to establish a guilty state of mind.”[25] This criminal intent qualifies both as knowledge of the infringements occurring and the knowing facilitation of future infringements due to a lack of filtering. This principle of finding guilt in a party who knowingly taking steps against receiving liability has been developed rationally by the 7th Circuit.[26] In United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d (7th Cir. 1988), the defendant, a drug trafficker, sought “to insulate himself from the actual drug transaction so that he could deny knowledge of it,”[27] which he did sometimes by absenting himself from the scene of the actual delivery and sometimes by pretending to be fussing under the hood of his car. As Judge Posner stated in reference to United States v. Diaz, “[the defendant] did not escape liability by [his] maneuver; no more can [the creator of a file-sharing program such as Aimster, Grokster or Kazaa] by... trying to prevent himself from learning what surely he strongly suspects to be the case: that the users of his service – maybe all the users of his service – are copyright infringers.”[28] In addition, Grokster has sold advertisements that individual users see as they search for content and has reported nearly ten million dollars in profits.[29] In addition, services such as Apple’s iTunes and the new version of Napster that are as pay-per-download services have proved economically viable.[30]

            The Justices will likely also take into account the alleged impact these peer-to-peer networks have had on copyright owners, as they did in Sony. In that case, Just Stevens affirmed that “even when an entire copyrighted work was recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair use ‘because there is no accompanying reduction in the market for `plaintiff's original work.’”[31]  Later, Justice Stevens concludes that, in regards to the importance of establishing injury, “a challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.”[32] However, while the Betamax VCR had no negative impact in the sales of the copied materials, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) estimates a $2 billion drop in record sales between 2001 and 2003, “a period that matches the growth of online music piracy services.”[33] Though some claim the peer-to-peer monetary impact on the recording industry is exaggerated,[34] there was no evidence at all in Sony to even suggest such damages as have been alleged in the Grokster case. In addition, the “loss of the ability to control the proliferation of ones intellectual property has had substantial impact on welfare of copyright owners.”[35] The amount of copyrighted material currently available on Kazaa’s networks is so unbelievably massive, nearly 60 million gigabytes (90% of which is illegally shared copyrighted material, the equivalent of 13,500,000,000 songs in digital format[36]), will be very persuasive for the Supreme Court Justices.

             The facts in the case are well established: 1) the respondents possessed relevant knowledge of the existence and incredible magnitude of said infringements occurring on their networks; 2) they acted deliberately in an attempt to both remove themselves from liability and allow unfiltered downloading; 3) and they knowingly made profits off of said allowance and knowledge of said infringements. Secondary liability precedents are well defined in opposition to the respondents and will allow the Supreme Court the ability to create a doctrine for applying the ideals in prior precedents to an updated file-sharing rule. Said Marybeth Peters, the US Register of Copyrights, of secondary liability doctrines, “they allow copyright owners to focus their enforcement (and licensing) efforts on those entities that foster infringing activity and have the resources and wherewithal to either pay licensing fees or satisfy an infringement judgment, without bringing costly, time-consuming and usually futile actions against multiple, mostly judgment-proof individual defendants.”[37] These secondary liability doctrines, as Ms. Peters describes, carry more weight than the out-dated precedents from Sony that are still unclear.

In June of this year, the Supreme Court will likely reject the precedents in Sony as being distinguishable and find that those who create and run deliberately de-centralized peer-to-peer file-sharing services like Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc. are liable for secondary copyright infringements.



[1] That case was Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029

[2] A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)

[3] The petitioners include the following companies: MGM; Colombia Pictures Industries, Inc.; Disney Enterprises, Inc.; Paramount Pictures Corporation; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation; Universal City Studios LLP, f/k/a Universal City Studios, Inc.; New Line Cinema Corporation; Time Warner Entertainment Company, LP; Atlantic Recording Corporation; Atlantic Rhino Ventures, Inc.; d/b/a Rhino Entertainment, Inc.; Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc.; London-Sire Records, Inc., LP; Warner Brothers Records, Inc.; WEA International Inc.; Warner Music Latina, Inc., f/k/a WEA Latina, Inc.; Arista Records, Inc.; Bad Boy Records; Capitol Records, Inc.; Hollywood Records, Inc.; Interscope Records; LaFace Records; Motown Record Company; RCA Records Label, a unit of BMG Music d/b/a BMG Entertainment; Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.; UMG Recordings, Inc.; Virgin Records America, Inc.; Walt Disney Records, a division of ABC, Inc.; Zomba Recording Corp.

[4] Napster ran everything off a central server, meaning that search queries went through a centralized Napster server and the best possible matches were displayed. Napster was found liable for the infringements taking place over their networks because “without the support services [Napster] provides, Napster users could not find and download the music they want with the ease of which [Napster] boasts,” said James DeLong of the Progress & Freedom Foundation. Grokster, on the other hand was “deliberately designed to be decentralized,” to the extent that users never actually interact with a Grokster server, but merely with each other. It is because of this removed relationship that Grokster has with its users that has kept the software company from being found liable for the infringements committed by its users.

[5] Said Marybeth Peters, the US Register of Copyrights, of secondary liability doctrines, “they allow copyright owners to focus their enforcement (and licensing) efforts on those entities that foster infringing activity and have the resources and wherewithal to either pay licensing fees or satisfy an infringement judgment, without bringing costly, time-consuming and usually futile actions against multiple, mostly judgment-proof individual defendants.” (Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, July 22, 2004.)

[6] The 2nd Circuit ruled in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) that Napster, Inc. was liable for secondary copyright infringement because it encourages, facilitates and benefits from the infringements committed over its networks. The 7th Circuit ruled similarly in In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation No. 02-4125 (7th Cir. 2003) against Aimster, a peer-to-peer file-sharing network.

[7] MGM initial brief for the Federal District Court for the Central District of California demanding Summary Judgment against Grokster, Inc. and StreamCast, Inc. in MGM v. Grokster, Dec. 2, 2002. <http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/20020913_mgm_summary_judgement.pdf> Accessed on April 1, 2004.

[8] Contributory infringement requires that the alleged infringer have knowledge of the infringement of the third party and that it aid, induce or actively contribute to the infringement. Vicarious infringement can be sustained when (1) the alleged infringer can exercise control over the direct infringer or infringing activity and (2) the alleged infringer had a direct financial interest in the infringement. These infringements are forms of secondary liability. See Southern Mississippi Planning and Development District, Inc. v. Robertson, 660 F.Supp. 1057 (S.D.Miss. 1986) and Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).

[9] Sony at 435.

[10] Id. at 436.

[11] Napster at 1032.

[12] Napster at 1035.

[13] Napster at 1051.

[14] Aimster at 649.

[15] Sony at 450-54, 456.

[16] Aimster was designed to encrypt users’ search queries so that the company may not monitor the material being transferred.

[17] Aimster at 650.

[18] MGM v. Grokster 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) at 11742.

[19] Id. at 11745.

[20] Id.

[21] Sony at 423-4.

[22] Id. at 424

[23] MGM initial brief for the Federal District Court for the Central District of California demanding Summary Judgment against Grokster, Inc. and StreamCast, Inc. in MGM v. Grokster, Dec. 2, 2002. <http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/20020913_mgm_summary_judgement.pdf> Accessed on April 1, 2004.

[24] Aimster at 650.

[25] Aimster at 650.

[26] See United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir.1985); AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 550 (7th Cir.1988).

[27] Aimster at 650.

[28] Id.

[29] MGM v. Grokster 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) at 11755.

[30] Petitioner’s Brief in the Grokster Case  

[31] Sony at 417, 426.

[32] Sony at 451.

[33] McGuire, David. “Lawmakers Push Prison For Online Pirates.” Washington Post 31 Mar. 2004. Washington Post Online. Accessed 31 Mar. 2005 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A40145-2004Mar31?language=printer>.

[34] See Oberholzer, Felix & Strumpf, Koleman. The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis. March, 2004. Accessed 31 Mar. 2004 <http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf>.

[35] Brief Amici Curiae of the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Directors Guild of America, Screen Actors Guild and Writers Guild of America on behalf of the petitioners, MGM et. al., in the Grokster case.

[36] Calculations provided by the Kazaa program upon running it on my local computer, April 5, 2005. Equivalence in number of songs calculated assuming an average song size of 4mb with 1000mb per gigabyte.

[37] Peters, Marybeth. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on S. 2560, the Intentional Inducement of Copyright Infringements Act of 2004: Statement of the Honorable Marybeth Peters. July 22, 2004. Accessed 2 April 2005. <http://www.corante.com/importance/archives/Statement_of_Marybeth_Peters_on_S_2560-1.pdf>.